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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we discuss the problems of visual interaction 
with emergency management systems in shipyards. After 
introducing the basic issues related to safety in shipyards, 
we present an information system and a set of visual inter-
faces to control the shipyard and support workers and safety 
responsible in case of an emergency evacuation. 
Author Keywords 
Yard safety, visual perception, visual communication, wire-
less personal device. 
ACM Classification Keywords 
H5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI): 
Miscellaneous.  
INTRODUCTION 
The need for hosting an increasing number of people in 
living spaces and transports has pushed engineering and 
architecture towards gigantic buildings: skyscrapers and 
ships are becoming self-contained environments offering a 
set of services typical of a small town. Such a building phi-
losophy requires a special attention to safety due to the 
huge number of people involved, the complex structure of 
spaces, the large range of activities performed inside, and 
the spread in people ability to react to adverse situations.  
The problems and the solutions to face adverse events are 
different during the building of such artifacts, with respect 
to their normal exercise. The highly dynamic nature of a 
yard, the diversity of people working in it, and the nature 
itself of the yard as a place where heavy activities  are per-
formed,  demand a different approach to safety with respect 
to the procedures to be adopted when the building (a sky-
scraper, a large factory, a cruise ship) is complete. One of 
the most critical problems to be faced in case of an adverse 
event is the evacuation of people working or living inside 
the building. Any satisfactory solution to this problem is 
grounded on the possibility to drive the evacuation in an 
ordered way. Conversely, the most critical situation is to 
face a disordered evacuation, defined as a type of evacua-
tion which adds damages and injuries to people beyond 
those due to the disaster.  
Evacuation plans and associated public displays are apt in 
case of a stable environmental configuration. During the 
building of an environment plans must be changed dynami-
cally with the evolution of the environment itself and the 
degree of completion. Hence, the problem doubles because 
not only the plan must be adapted with fast dynamics, but 
also it must be delivered to the workers timely. 
We have developed a study with Fincantieri SpA, the larg-
est Italian shipbuilding company, to design an information 
system able to assist the persons in charge of safety to 
elaborate dynamic evacuation plans and to control them 
visually. In this paper we discuss the issues related to the 
management of information about the ship status during the 
evolution of its building, the visual representation of critical 
situations that could lead to severe problems in case of 
emergency, and the delivery to workers of the details of the 
evacuation in case of a problem, like a large fire, possibly 
leading to a disaster. Information about the ship status and 
the communication between safety responsibles and work-
ers have been analyzed in terms of visual and acoustic in-
teraction, taking into account the specificity of shipyards, 
which pose a number of constraints on the approaches and 
on the devices to be used.  
SAFETY IN SHIPYARDS 
A shipyard presents a number of issues adversely affecting 
safety in case of emergency, which can be grouped in three 
classes of constraints:  
Architectural constraints. A ship is very complex and 
large; hosting a few thousands people during cruises, it con-
tains a large spread of services typical of a small-to-
medium town in a much smaller space. During its building 
its spatial configuration progresses from ample wide spaces 
to closed specialized rooms (Figure 1); consequently the 
paths for moving inside it and the visual orientation cues 
change frequently. Finally, the large amount of metal used 
limits radio communication. 
 
 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies 
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, 
or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior 
specific permission and/or a fee. 
CHI 2008,   April 5–10, 2008, Florence, Italy. 
Copyright 2008 ACM  978-1-60558-011-1/08/04…$5.00 
 2 
Human constraints. Workers in a shipyard are very het-
erogeneous, with different base cultures and different skills. 
As many as 70 different languages have been counted, Eng-
lish being often unknown; emergency messages may be 
misunderstood, or not understood at all. 
Organization constraints. Changes in the environment are 
recorded with variable delays, thus leading to inconsistency 
between the ship state known by the persons in charge of 
safety and the real state, possibly suggesting emergency 
actions that refer to an outdated ship configuration. The 
most critical concern is that workers often do not know the 
real danger level to which they can be exposed, possibly 
taking wrong decisions in case of emergency. 
Actors, Perspectives and Goals 
To understand the links among the activities related to 
safety, we briefly introduce the perspectives and the goals 
of the different actors: the workers, the onboard emergency 
workers, the rescue team, and the information system ad-
ministrator.  
In case of emergency, workers need to receive promptly 
reliable information about the direction to follow for reach-
ing the nearest safe exit, and must be alerted if they choose 
the wrong way.    
The goal of the onboard emergency responsible is to keep 
the shipyard environment safe, i.e., without obstacles along 
the evacuation ways, using tools to monitor overcrowding 
and occlusions that might diminish the ability to evacuate 
people.    
The rescue team, that operates when the emergency is on, 
must be aware of the number of persons saved so far, the 
number of persons still in danger and their location, using 
the most updated information about the ship state.     
The information system administrator must guarantee the 
continuity of operation and the continuous update of the 
information system.  
EVACUATION MANAGEMENT 
The main goals of a correct evacuation are to be fast and 
ordered, to give correct information to people in danger, 
and to keep control over the environment. They are 
achieved by a correct mix of prevention and intervention. 
Prevention mainly requires the analysis of the potential 
sources of emergency problems, through a network of sen-
sors monitoring the state of the ship. Intervention requires 
fast delivering of correct information, as well as the limita-
tion of damage propagation with physical or organizational 
means. 
Therefore, an evacuation management system operates in 
two distinct phases: observation time and emergency time. 
Observation time. During the normal work information 
about the ship state is collected and processed, generating 
knowledge about the workers flows and the rooms over-
crowding. This phase prepares the system to face an 
evacuation in case of emergency and gives to the onboard 
emergency workers a way to get information on the ship 
environment.    
Emergency time. The system delivers reliable information 
about how to leave the ship in safety, providing both on-
board emergency workers and rescue teams with detailed 
information on the state of the ship, on the evacuation pro-
gress and on the number of saved people.    
Both phases rely on the management and the delivery of 
critical information, hence depend on how the information 
is perceived. At last, they depend on how the information is 
presented, since an emergency situation benefits from pre-
attentive stimuli and unbiased signals universally inter-
preted.  
The Emergency Plan 
The emergency plan is part of Fincantieri's Internal Proce-
dure Book, and is drawn by the emergency workers super-
visor at shipyard installation. The emergency plan defines 
     
Figure 1. A view of a ship bridge before (left) and after (right) the installation of the cabins 
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Figure 3. The emergency management system architecture 
the following procedures: evaluation of the fire risk; identi-
fication of risks on board; identification of people exposed 
to risk; classification of the risk level; prevention measures; 
first assistance. The most important part of this document is 
the first assistance procedure, that we briefly outline.   
In case of  a fire start or of another risky event, everybody 
is compelled to report it to the firemen and to the first assis-
tence team. Four steps follow.  
1. The emergency workers visually examine the work 
areas looking for the fire start location. They alert the 
intervention teams and signal the alarm using speakers. 
2. Any worker finding a fire must alert the emercency 
workers headquarter.   
3. The emergency workers try to contain the fire, alert the 
emergency worker's headquaters reporting about the 
fire evolution, in terms of new fires and estinguished 
ones. At the same time the evacuation starts: the emer-
gency workers try to control the escape routes and keep 
count of the number of safe people.   
4. As soon as firemen and rescue teams arrive, the emer-
gency workers transmit them all the information about 
the fire and the status of the evacuation. 
The analysis made with Fincantieri highlighted two syn-
thetic features able to anticipate critical situations: conges-
tion index and flow index, respectively measuring the ratio 
between people and environment size and capacity, and 
between people flowing through passages and passage ca-
pacity. In most cases the capacity of environments and pas-
sages is fixed by safety regulations [1], but the presence of 
temporary occlusions due to building material and the reac-
tion of persons to an emergency situation might reduce the 
capacity and cause the limits to be surpassed. We shall dis-
cuss the use of such indexes in the next section. 
THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
A ship is spatially organized in a three level hierarchy [2]: 
decks, which mark a vertical decomposition, main vertical 
zones (MVZ) corresponding to the longitudinal watertight 
compartments, and rooms, like halls and cabins, which are 
the areas in a MVZ which can be traversed in case of an 
emergency, if free from temporary occlusions. At a finer 
detail, locations in a ship are identified by a set of coordi-
nates related to the deck, the longitudinal frame (counted 
onward and backward from the rudder), and the ship side 
(left, center, right) as depicted in Figure 2. 
A database is built around such a ship structure. It has a 
fixed content, describing the ship structure, and a variable 
content defined by data coming from sensolrs which moni-
tor the ship areas during building, which change according 
to the actual ship state. 
The emergency management system architecture is shown 
in Figure 3. The sensors layer manages the hardware and 
software (drivers) infrastructure needed to store in the data-
base the information on the ship status.    
The statistics subsystem is part of the service layer and 
manages a data structure containing information about 
overcrowding and workers flows through the different ship 
rooms. Raw data are read from the database and processed 
to inizialize the statistics subsystem.      
The presentation subsystem uses information from the sta-
tistics subsystem and from sensors to create visual maps 
about the ship and workers situation. 
The evacuation plan creator, using information coming 
from the sensor layer, calculates the best escape ways. The 
evacuation plan creator stores the information in a data 
structure which will be used by the emergency workers 
subsystem.  
 
 
Figure 2. The ship coordinate systems 
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Figure 4. Information flow in the emergency  
management system 
 
Figure 5. Visualization of room occupation 
In case of emergency, the emergency subsystem uses the 
data provided by the evacuation plan creator to signal the 
best escape ways through the portable devices wore by the 
ship workers.  
Figure 4 illustrates the information flow between the sen-
sors, database and service layers. 
The sensors monitor the workers’ location inside the envi-
ronment (1). Signals coming from the sensors are processed 
and converted into usable information (2); since the number 
of the sensors is high, sensor drivers must be able to con-
figure the sensors’ settings (3).  
Sensors send updated information to the database (4). The 
database is constantly updated to reflect the current ship 
situation both in normal situation and in an emergency 
situation, concerning ship workers, onboard emergency 
workers and rescue teams involved (5). 
The statistics subsystem creates and stores the data struc-
tures containing raw information related to people's flow, 
overcrowding and ship status (6). The raw statistic data are 
combined and interpreted to provide meaningful and reli-
able information to the onboard emergency workers (7). 
Collected statistc data are also used to create an evacuation 
plan, dynamically updated as the workers flow changes (8). 
Visual information is presented on the personal devices of 
the onboard emergency workers (9). If the ship must be 
evacuated, visual information about the safe escape routes 
is sent to the emergency subsystem that manages the emer-
gency panels and the workers personal displays (10). 
Feedback is sent to the emergency database in order to 
identify critical points such as persisting overcrowding, 
occlusions and changes in the escape routes due to the 
emergency evolution (11). 
CHECKING OVERCROWDING AND PEOPLE FLOW 
The analysis made with Fincantieri highlighted two syn-
thetic features able to anticipate critical situations if kept 
under continuous control: congestion index and flow index, 
respectively measuring the ratio between people and envi-
ronment size and capacity (hence overcrowding), and be-
tween people flowing through passages and passage capac-
ity (hence critical situations due to people congestion). In 
most cases the capacity of environments and passages is 
fixed by safety regulations [1], but the presence of tempo-
rary occlusions due to building material and the reaction of 
persons to an emergency situation might reduce the capac-
ity and cause the limits to be surpassed.  
The data collected by the sensors must visually represent 
such information in the ship environment, i.e., corridors, 
rooms, open areas, etc. To display the ship environment we 
overlap visual information processed by the sensor level to 
the ship CAD project. Visualization is thus linked to the 
ship structure, and may concern a bridge, a MVZ across all 
the bridges, a MVZ of a single bridge, and the whole envi-
ronment of a bridge (least level of granularity). 
Information about overcrowding is represented using col-
ors; each color represents a different level of overcrowding, 
as defined by a legend on the right side of the display. 
Warm colors represent high people concentration, cold col-
ors represent a low people concentration. In Figure 5 the 
rooms of a MVZ are colored, every room has a brief de-
scription and displays the number of people inside. In such 
a way both qualitative and quantitative information is dis-
played, highlighting the real danger level. 
The representation of people flow is more complex. The 
concept of ‘passage’ used in buildings, e.g., a door, is un-
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Figure 6. Visual representation of people flow across  
checkpoints 
unsuitable in a shipyard, due to the large number of types 
and shapes: doors, openings, stairs, steps, etc. We use the 
concept of checkpoint (CKP) to define any point in the en-
vironment the number of people crossing through is limited 
and can be measured. 
Every checkpoint has a theoretical capacity: the number of 
people that can cross it in a period of time without danger. 
Work tools and materials laying in the environment can 
reduce the checkpoint capacity, so we must know which is 
the real capacity and how much it is reduced with respect to 
the theoretical capacity. Both must be displayed to identify 
situations where the actual state of an environment or of a 
checkpoint could increase the risk level and lessen the 
evacuation speed. A similar concept is the comparison be-
tween the current people flow and the allowed flow as de-
fined by the actual capacity, to identify situations where the 
dynamics of people moving could create bottlenecks and 
occlusions. 
These two pairs of measures are represented using indica-
tors in the shape of flames; two overlapped isosceles trian-
gles of different color: blue for the theoretical capacity, red 
for the real capacity, and green/red flames for visualizing 
the ration between the actual flow and the capacity. Flames 
are drawn on the ship plan, aligned with the checkpoints. 
The triangle vertex represents the flow direction; the theo-
retical capacity, is represented in the background since it is 
alway greater or equal to the real capacity, as depicted in 
Figure 6. 
We used flames rather than arrows or other figures after a 
set of tests. An arrow would be too thin to be clearly per-
ceived in size and color; rectangular shapes cover a larger 
area, hiding the information below, while a triangle is the 
geometric figures with the smallest area with respect to its 
sides. In the area of background triangle we can rapresent 
quantitative as well as qualitative information (through the 
color), and the direction of the flow; overlap between the 
triangles immediately shows their relationship.  
COMMUNICATING WITH WORKERS  
Most of the information about the ship actual configuration 
collected during the prevention phase is used to calculate 
and communicate to workers the escape routes in case of 
emergency [2]. Such information, and the way of presenting 
it, depends on a number of issues: 
1. Radio communication, while limited by the metal 
shields composing most of a ship infrastructure, is the 
only type of communication usable due to the dynam-
ics of the shipyard which prevent cable deployment. 
Experiments have shown that frequencies above 1 
GHz assure a good coverage, given that the space pre-
cision allowed (and required) is the identification of 
the room (in a wide sense) where the worker is.  
2. Workers usually do not know the whole ship but only 
the part in which they work. Suggesting them a path 
through unknown ship areas increases the risk; longer 
escape paths can be safer if they cross only areas to 
which workers are accustomed, where they can find 
known visual cues. 
3. Different ship areas are exposed to different risk lev-
els. Normative institutions have issued a classification 
of danger in different environments [1]; a good escape 
route crosses areas with decreasing danger level. 
4. Since people work in groups, the evacuation proce-
dure is safer if during the escape the cohesion of the 
group is maintained. This principle is very important 
because the ability to help each other is increased by 
people being used to work together, by speaking the 
same language, by being used to understand each 
other, and by being able to integrate their partial 
knowledge of the environment into a more complete 
view of the situation. 
To signal the escape routes three issues are important: (1) to 
take care of the changes in the environment due to the 
building progress, from a skeleton of wide spaces to a com-
plex structure of small rooms, requiring to adapt the granu-
larity and the range of the signals; (2) to differentiate the 
stimuli used to signal escape routes and wrong paths, using 
visual signs for positive stimuli and auditory signs for nega-
tive stimuli; (3) to avoid the use of text in favor of graphics 
and symbols independent from specific languages and cul-
tures. 
According to these issues, we have proposed two ap-
proaches: a weak approach and a strong approach, differen-
tiated by the spatial granularity of signs and information 
delivery. In both cases we assume that workers have a per-
sonal device able to issue simple graphic signs and audio 
signals. 
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Weak approach 
Workers are fed with fuzzy cues which refer to a few well 
known locations easy to identify according to their func-
tion. During a simulation it was evident that due to the little 
detail present in initial phases of ship building, environ-
ments are poorly distinguishable unless they are focal 
points in the ship (e.g., a hall, which can be easily recog-
nized even if incomplete), or are connection nodes, such as 
stairs and elevators. Such environments are generally 
known by all workers, and being a few (with respect to cab-
ins and corridors) are easily identifiable on a small personal 
device capable of limited detail. 
Strong approach 
The visual and acoustic personal device carried by each 
worker is used both for tracking the worker position and for 
driving him to a safe escape. The device is used together 
with environmental displays based on laser or laser-like 
lights with different colors marking selected crossing points 
such as doors and gates to be followed to reach a safe loca-
tion. 
Dangerous situations arise in two main cases, which define 
the two most frequently observed wrong behaviors: to stand 
still and to undertake the wrong exit or path. Visual cues are 
given for mistakes of small entity, while acoustic signals 
are used for most serious erroneous behaviors. 
The personal device used for conveying to the workers the 
information about the escape routes must emit simple visual 
and acoustic signals. The device technical features are de-
fined according to the analysis made by Fincantieri. Con-
cerning the device positioning: (1) it must be easy to read in 
an emergency situation, and (2) the position sensor must not 
be shielded by the worker activity.  
The worker might be engaged in an activity which could 
shield a sensor kept in a pocket or worn as a necklace. Tests 
have shown as a viable solution its positioning in the safety 
boots. However, this position prevents reading, thus the 
device must be split in two components: an active RFID 
indoor position sensor [3], and a wrist-band display, com-
municating via wireless connection. The two components 
interact with a central server,  which reads the position of 
the worker (i.e., the room) and sends information on the 
escape route adapted to the worker situation.  
The device works both in the weak and in the strong ap-
proach.  In a strong approach, the device could be com-
posed of a set of colored leds, making it very reliable and 
robust. A control and diagnostic unit must however be fore-
seen, to avoid the risk of delivering wrong information due 
to a device fault. 
CHOOSING THE RIGHT APPROACH 
From a general point of view, during the building of a ship 
the system should evolve from a weak to a strong approach. 
A strong approach requires positioning a larger number of 
visual escape signs, and such positioning cannot be done in 
a highly dynamic and highly incomplete environment. A 
weak approach is the only viable one when the ship infra-
structure is not complete. 
On the other side, as the ship building proceeds, it is more 
equipped with stable, final safety devices, which reduce the 
risk of an emergency, but is less tolerant to the implant of 
temporary safety devices.  
Moreover, while in principle a personal device is required 
for fast, personalized signaling of evacuation procedures, it 
may nevertheless be incompatible with part of the safety 
vest required in dedicated environments. Therefore, a 
strong approach, while superior, is difficult to apply on a 
large scale. 
CONCLUSION 
The evolution of an event like a fire is not impulsive or in-
stantaneous. It starts in a localized area and may extend 
potentially to all the ship. But its speed allows people in 
charge of safety to adopt local strategies and to follow its 
evolution, starting with the evacuation of a limited number 
of people close to the fire center, and proceeding to a total 
evacuation only if the event cannot be controlled. A plausi-
ble strategy can be based on three elements: 
1. An evacuation signal (visual and/or acoustic) must be 
forwarded only to people inside the area subject to an 
immediate risk, through the personal device and the 
signs in the focal locations. 
2. A feedback signal must be received by the people in 
charge of the emergency management, by monitoring 
the position of people at risk, checking that they are 
moving in the right direction. 
3. In case the feedback shows immobilized persons, the 
personal device can be used as a beacon to guide the 
rescue squad. 
In this way, an up-to-date view of the event dynamics can 
guarantee that the emergency is under control.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This work has been supported by Fincantieri SpA. 
REFERENCES 
1. International Maritime Organization. SOLAS. London. 
UK, 2004. 
2. Holland America Line. Hull.6079, General Arrangement 
Plan. Fincantieri, 2005. 
3. L.M.Ni, Y.Liu, Yiu Cho Lau, A.P.Patil. LANDMARC: 
Indoor Location Sensing Using Active RFID.  Kluwer 
academic Publisher, 2004. 
 
 
